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Abstract
Development cooperation actors have been addressing climate change as a cross-
cutting issue and investing in climate adaptation projects since the early 2000s. 
More recently, as concern has risen about the potential impacts of climate variabil-
ity and change on human mobility, development cooperation actors have begun to 
design projects that intentionally address the drivers of migration, including climate 
impacts on livelihoods. However, to date, we know little about the development 
cooperation’s role and function in responding to climate related mobility and migra-
tion. As such, the main aim of this paper is to outline the policy frameworks and 
approaches shaping development cooperation actors’ engagement and to identify 
areas for further exploration and investment. First, we frame the concept of climate 
mobility and migration and discuss some applicable policy frameworks that govern 
the issue from various perspectives; secondly, we review the toolbox of approaches 
that development cooperation actors bring to climate mobility; and third, we dis-
cuss the implications of the current Covid-19 pandemic and identify avenues for the 
way forward. We conclude that ensuring safe and orderly mobility and the decent 
reception and long-term inclusion of migrants and displaced persons under condi-
tions of more severe climate hazards, and in the context of rising nationalism and 
xenophobia, poses significant challenges. Integrated approaches across multiple 
policy sectors and levels of governance are needed. In addition to resources, devel-
opment cooperation actors can bring data to help empower the most affected com-
munities and regions and leverage their convening power to foster more coordinated 
approaches within and across countries.
Introduction
The literature on climate mobility largely agrees that climate factors contribute to 
migration (both voluntary and forced), but that their contribution generally operates 
through socioeconomic factors such as wage differentials, family reunification, and 
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the quest for improved living standards (Foresight, 2011). Controlling for other fac-
tors known to influence migration decision making, researchers have attributed migra-
tion to deviations in temperature and precipitation (Nawrotzki et  al., 2015b) and to 
climate extremes such as storms, floods, and drought (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017). 
Many of these impacts are traced through the “agricultural pathway” (Nawrotzki & 
Bakhtsiyarava, 2017), meaning that the impact of climate on migration is moderated 
by changes in agricultural productivity.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, climate adaptation became part 
of the development cooperation agenda, and aid agencies increasingly focused on 
mainstreaming adaptation into their development portfolios (Eriksen & Naess, 2003, 
Huq & Reid, 2004; Agrawala & Van Aalst, 2008). Today, development cooperation 
actors—defined here as encompassing donors of development assistance (includ-
ing governments acting through bilateral and multilateral channels, as well as non-
governmental and private donors) and implementing agencies that provide technical 
assistance1—have come to realize that climate information related to past variability, 
current change, and future projections is vital for understanding how various sec-
tors may be stressed by climate extremes and at risk of future impacts. Yet, while 
we now have a better understanding of the current and projected impacts of climate 
change on various economic sectors, the social and political dimensions of popu-
lation responses to climate change remain a topic of active research (IPCC, 2014, 
2018).
Migration is an integral part of development processes (UNCTAD, 2018; UNDP, 
2009). Yet, the development policy discourse has long conceived of migration as 
a symptom of development failure, as evidenced in a recurring focus on address-
ing the “root causes” of migration (e.g., ICPD, 1994; UNGA, 2018a). International 
policy discussions on migration have traditionally focused on risks—such as migra-
tion draining developing countries of their “best and brightest” (Özden & Schiff, 
2006)—and vulnerabilities, including the exploitation of migrant workers and 
protection needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. At the beginning of 
the 2000s, a more positive discourse emerged (GCIM, 2005; UNGA, 2006, 2013), 
based on evidence that the size of global remittances far outstrips official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) (e.g., Ratha & Xu, 2008), and of migration’s tangible con-
tributions to poverty reduction (e.g., Ratha, 2013) and human development (UNDP, 
2009). However, with the bifurcation of aid flows and international institutions into 
humanitarian and development mandates, the needs of migrants and refugees in 
developing countries have traditionally been addressed by humanitarian actors. This 
changed as the mass exodus of refugees from Syria, which overwhelmed neighbor-
ing countries and led to a spike in arrivals to Europe in 2015, ushered in recognition 
that greater global responsibility-sharing is needed (UNGA,  2016a, b,  2018b). 
Donors, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations pledged to 
better align humanitarian and development assistance (UNGA,  2016a). Conse-
quently, development cooperation actors have been drawn into responding to large 
1 In line with the broad development notion underpinning the Sustainable Development Goals, this 
includes specialized entities such as the International Organization for Migration, for instance.
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movements and protracted refugee situations in developing countries. The case for a 
developmental approach to displacement has been further bolstered by an increasing 
body of research making the case for the benefits of fostering refugee self-reliance 
and integration in local labor markets and economies (e.g. Betts et al., 2016).
As development cooperation actors have become increasingly active in address-
ing migration and displacement situations, this paper seeks to shed light on their 
role in anticipating and responding to climate-related mobility. As such, the goal of 
this paper is to explore the existing “toolbox” that development cooperation actors 
bring to this issue and to identify areas for further exploration and activity. We do 
not seek to settle the sometimes controversial question of whether the effects of 
continued global warming will trigger large-scale movements. Large movements 
are already occurring, in some cases with climate anomalies as antecedents (Kelley 
et al., 2015), and development cooperation actors have been called upon to respond. 
We examine the tools and approaches they have developed and how those might 
need to be adapted to address the challenge of climate related mobility.
We focus on human mobility as a broad concept encompassing various types of 
movement including voluntary migration as adaptation, forced displacement, and 
planned relocation of communities. We examine how development cooperation 
actors approach the nexus of climate change adaptation and migration. We chose 
this approach to cover the depth and breadth of development cooperation actors’ 
responses to climate-related mobility. However, for specific cases, we clearly refer-
ence the particular type of mobility under discussion.
This review article is based on a comprehensive review of more than 25 reports 
produced by development agencies on the subject of climate mobility, and a review 
of 40 articles or reports on development interventions and programmes related to 
climate-related migration or associated issues of climate hazard displacement. It 
also reflects the more than 50-year collective experience of the authors in the field 
of climate related mobility, as well as engagement with development cooperation 
actors such as the World Bank, US Agency for International Development (USAID), 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Environment Programme 
(UNEP) on issues of climate vulnerability, adaptation, and migration. Rather than 
a systematic literature review, this article presents a policy-oriented discussion of 
how the development community has approached the complex issues around climate 
mobility and what might be done in the future.
We divide our exposition in three sections. “Framing climate mobility: concepts 
and policy frameworks” defines the frameworks of climate change and migration or 
mobility and discusses migration as a response to climate hazards and how various 
policy frameworks treat the issue, “The role of development cooperation in address-
ing climate mobility” explores how development cooperation actors approach cli-
mate mobility, and “Future prospects and policy implications” highlights challenges 
and opportunities for the way forward.
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Framing climate mobility: concepts and policy frameworks
Environmental migration is generally understood as a form of forced migration 
(Hugo, 1996) in which environmental changes, generally operating through eco-
nomic, social, and political factors (Foresight, 2011), induce people to move outside 
their original habitats. The concept of climate migration is narrower, and often used 
interchangeably with other terms such as climate-induced migration, climate dis-
placement, climate refugee flows, climate-related movement, and climate mobility. 
There is no consensus or definitional clarity about what terminology to use (Ferris,  
2020; McMichael et al., 2021). Terms like climate refugee are popular but problem-
atic (de Sherbinin, 2020), since refugee status is conferred based on international 
law and limited to people crossing an international border and fleeing persecution 
owing to strictly define factors such as their race, ethnicity, faith, membership of a 
particular social group, or political beliefs.2 Scientists are increasingly adopting the 
term climate mobility (Baldwin et al., 2019; Farbotko, 2020), which acknowledges 
the diversity of forms and directions of population movement in the context of cli-
mate variability and change (Boas et al., 2019).
People can respond to climate stressors by either adapting in place, for instance, 
through livelihood changes or diversification, or they may decide to move elsewhere 
(Nawrotzki et  al., 2015a). In some cases, they may pursue a mixed strategy with 
some members of the household moving, while others stay behind, leading to trans-
local and transnational ties that sustain households (Greiner et  al., 2015). Move-
ment responses are shaped by the sudden or slow-onset nature of climate-related 
impacts: Fast-onset events (floods, cyclones) tend to trigger reactive movements of a 
more temporary nature (people return when the event subsides), whereas slow-onset 
events (such as sea-level rise or increases in temperature) may be associated with 
more anticipatory and durable patterns of mobility, whereby return is less likely if 
not impossible (Kalin, 2010, Black et al., 2011, Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Nawrotzki 
et  al., 2016). However, repeated climate-related disasters may either erode house-
hold assets to the point that people are “trapped” in place (Ayeb Karlsson et  al., 
2018, Black et al., 2011) or they determine that is best to move on (Rigaud et al., 
2018).
Newer research seeks to deepen our understanding of the inherent propensity 
of certain subpopulations to consider migration as an option in the face of cli-
mate and other risks (Adams & Kay, 2019). Furthermore, many people do not 
wish or perceive the need to move despite increasing climate risks or declines in 
habitability (Adger et al., 2021). It remains a consistent finding that even in areas 
with apparently declining climatic and environmental conditions, migrants, when 
interviewed, still primarily cite economic motivations for moving (Romankiewicz 
& Doevenspeck, 2015), reinforcing the finding that climate and environmental 
2 There are ongoing discussions about expanding the definition of refugees to include those affected by 
climate impacts (Gonzalez, 2020), but this is beyond the scope of this article. It is important to recognize 
that terminology is not solely a matter of semantics. Definitions and legal categorizations do matter to 
development cooperation, since it may affect who qualifies for assistance.
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factors operate through more traditional drivers, such as the desire to escape 
entrenched poverty in source areas. Thus, in some senses, climate change may be 
blamed for migration that has roots in deep historical inequalities, historic emis-
sions, and power imbalances at national and international levels, revealing that the 
burden of adaptation falls disproportionately on the poor (Gonzalez, 2020; Ribot 
et al., 2020; Bettini & Goli, 2016).
While most climate mobility is anticipated to be internal (DFID, 2009), statis-
tical methods have been used to calculate the number of international migrants 
and asylum seekers who may have moved owing to climate impacts, and even to 
project these numbers in the future based on climate scenarios (Abel et al., 2019; 
Feng et  al., 2010; Missirian & Schlenker, 2017). These efforts have been criti-
cized either on methodological grounds (Auffhammer & Vincent, 2012) or due to 
the many assumptions and uncertainties involved. The facts suggest that interna-
tional migration stocks have remained relatively stable at 3.5% of global population 
(UNPD, 2019) and that climate change is not a primary driver (Ribot et al., 2020; 
Rigaud et al., 2018). Yet, the number of displaced persons stands at a record high 
(UNHCR, 2020), and climate change has been identified as a threat-multiplier that 
can make already difficult situations even worse (e.g., Lake Chad Basin, Horn of 
Africa) (Dalby, 2018). Even a modest increase in refugee numbers threatens to over-
whelm an international protection system already at the breaking point (Aleinikoff 
& Zamore, 2019; Katz, 2020).
The discourse on climate mobility has shifted from framing migration as a nega-
tive consequence of climate change impacts to describing it as a form of human 
adaptation (McLeman & Smit, 2006; Vinke et  al., 2020), though the “migration 
as adaptation” framing has been criticized as a reincarnation of equally rosy por-
trayals of migration as a necessary feature of economic development (Bettini & 
Goli, 2016). The debate on migration as adaptation has been extended as scholars 
consider the translocal dimensions of adaptation, which understands that migrants 
are often connected to multiple places, including origin and destination areas, and 
potentially other diaspora communities (McMichael et al., 2021), all of which has 
been facilitated by the Internet and social media.
From a development perspective, migration as adaptation serves a number of pur-
poses. First, migration of individuals or households to less risky or more suitable 
environments can reduce exposure to climate hazards (de Sherbinin et  al., 2012). 
Second, at the household-level, migration of one or more individuals can be part 
of a livelihood diversification and risk-reduction strategy, whereby remittances 
from household members in destination areas help to support the economic unit and 
smooth out household consumption during times of distress (Massey et al., 1993). 
Third, migration can increase household assets in source areas and thereby resilience 
to climate change. Fourth, migration can reduce the number of household members 
to support and thereby increase food security for those who remain behind (Rain, 
2018). Lastly, returning migrants and migrant associations can bring new skills and 
knowledge to their communities and countries of origin (“brain gain”).
Migration can also be maladaptive. For example, migrants can move into areas 
of greater risk (e.g., informal settlements at risk of flooding and landslides); 
migration can deprive communities of labor (“brain drain”), and can contribute 
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to the decline of rural communities, making them less resilient to climate impacts 
(Black et al., 2011). Too often, migrants experience serious risk of injury, exploi-
tation, and death on their journeys, especially in the context of large mixed move-
ments of refugees and other “survival migrants” (Betts, 2010), as exemplified 
by recent large movements from Syria, Myanmar, Venezuela, and Guatemala. 
Finally, forced displacement, while serving as a survival mechanism, especially 
in the context of sudden onset disasters, often undermines development gains and 
leaves people in situations of limbo.
The precise balance of benefits and risks of migration varies significantly based 
on the degree to which the decision to move is voluntary and well-informed, the 
profiles of those who move (age, health, assets, skills etc.), the context of their 
journeys, conditions in destination areas, and the ability to stay connected with 
people and places left behind (UNDP, 2009). Various policy frameworks address 
both the potential opportunities and risks that come with migration and displace-
ment in the context of climate hazards and disasters (for a comprehensive over-
view see: IOM, 2018b). However, none establishes binding rules and few provide 
detailed policy guidance.
The Cancun Adaptation Framework (2010) invites States to coordinate and 
cooperate on “climate induced displacement, migration and planned relocation.” 
Meanwhile, displacement is framed as a form of “loss and damage” under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Warsaw Interna-
tional Mechanism on Loss and Damage from 2013. COP 21 in 2015 created the 
Taskforce on Displacement, an advisory body tasked with developing recommen-
dations for integrated approaches to “avert, minimize and address displacement 
related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2015: paragraph 
49).
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) conceptualizes popu-
lation movements as both a source of risk and a contributor to strengthening the 
resilience of people and communities. It further recognizes that migrants, with their 
knowledge, skills, and capacities, can contribute to the design and implementation 
of disaster risk reduction measures.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for “leaving no one behind,” 
explicitly recognizing the need to empower people who are vulnerable, including 
refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants and to enhance the resilience of 
refugee hosting communities. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) feature 
several migration-related targets, including target 10.7 to “facilitate orderly, safe, 
and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementa-
tion of planned and well-managed migration policies,” which is framed as a contri-
bution to the goal of reducing inequality.
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (shortly Global 
Compact for Migration, GCM, 2018), the first comprehensive—but non-binding—
international agreement to spell out how states ought to manage international migra-
tion, is built on the idea that migration should be a choice, not a necessity; involun-
tary movements should be reduced and prevented, as should irregular migration that 
undermines the rule of law and leaves migrants vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
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The GCM outlines a comprehensive set of policy recommendations for managing 
movements induced by “natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and 
environmental degradation” (UNGA, 2018a: 10/36), including actions to minimize 
adverse drivers of migration by strengthening resilience and adaptation strategies, 
integrating displacement into disaster preparedness, and undertaking joint contin-
gency planning (GCM Objective 2), as well as actions to enhance pathways for regu-
lar migration, including through both temporary and permanent legal avenues for 
climate migration, where necessary (GCM Objective 5). Table 1 provides a more 
detailed overview of relevant GCM provisions.
The GCM includes a detailed set of policy options on climate change and migra-
tion, largely because States have been reluctant to address this issue in the context of 
the existing refugee protection regime established in the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol, which do not recognize people displaced due to the impacts 
of climate or environmental changes.
The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), developed and adopted in parallel to 
the GCM in 2018, acknowledges that “climate, environmental degradation and natu-
ral disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements,” but does 
not recognize them as drivers in their own right (GCR, 2018: para 8). According to 
UNHCR, multiple provisions within the GCR can however be interpreted to suggest 
its applicability to situations of cross-border displacement in the context of disasters 
and environmental degradation (UNHCR, 2019). Some regional refugee protection 
frameworks, such as the Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention and the 
Cartagena Declaration in the Americas, as well as the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (1998) include provisions that explicitly or implicitly extend protec-
tion to those moving due to disasters or environmental causes, and States have used 
them to that effect (Adeola, 2020; Weerasinghe, 2018).
Much of the policy agenda outlined in the GCM builds on the work of the Nansen 
Initiative, an informal process initiated by the Governments of Norway and Switzer-
land in 2012, and its successor, the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD, 2021). 
In 2015, 109 countries endorsed the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Dis-
placed Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, a guidance docu-
ment that was developed by the Nansen Initiative through a series of consultations 
with governments and other stakeholders. It covers preparedness before displace-
ment occurs, protection and assistance during displacement, and transition to solu-
tions in the aftermath of a disaster. The Platform for Disaster Displacement works 
to promote the implementation of the Protection Agenda and serves as a center of 
gravity convening governments and connecting them with researchers, international 
and non-governmental organizations active in the fields of climate and migration.
Given the number of different frameworks that govern the nexus of climate change, 
migration, and displacement, inevitable challenges of policy coherence arise both 
within the climate and the migration sectors, as well as across them. For instance, 
climate policy may see migration as a means to support adaptation, yet cross-border 
movements of people are subject to national and regional migration policies that gen-
erally do not conform to climate policy objectives and may be more or less guided by 
the patchwork of international frameworks that govern migration, from the GCM to  
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
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Table 1  Global compact for migration language on climate migration
Field of action GCM language
(1) Analysis and information- sharing Strengthen joint analysis and sharing of information to better 
map, understand, predict, and address migration move-
ments, such as those that may result from sudden-onset and 
slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate 
change, environmental degradation, and other precarious 
situations, while ensuring the effective respect, protection, 
and fulfillment of the human rights of all migrants
(2) Adaptation and resilience strategies Develop adaptation and resilience strategies to sudden-onset 
and slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate 
change, and environmental degradation, such as desertifica-
tion, land degradation, drought, and sea level rise, taking into 
account the potential implications on migration, while recog-
nizing that adaptation in the country of origin is a priority
(3) Disaster preparedness, early warning 
and contingency planning
Integrate displacement considerations into disaster prepared-
ness strategies and promote cooperation with neighboring 
and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, 
contingency planning, stockpiling, coordination mecha-
nisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance 
arrangements, and public information
(4) Reception and humanitarian assistance Harmonize and develop approaches and mechanisms at 
subregional and regional levels to address the vulnerabilities 
of persons affected by sudden-onset and slow-onset natural 
disasters, by ensuring they have access to humanitarian 
assistance that meets their essential needs with full respect 
for their rights wherever they are, and by promoting sustain-
able outcomes that increase resilience and self-reliance, 
taking into account the capacities of all countries involved
(5) Admission and stay Develop or build on existing national and regional practices 
for admission and stay of appropriate duration based on 
compassionate, humanitarian or other considerations for 
migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin, 
due to sudden-onset natural disasters and other precari-
ous situations, such as by providing humanitarian visas, 
private sponsorships, access to education for children, and 
temporary work permits, while adaptation in or return to 
their country of origin is not possible
(6) Relocation Cooperate to identify, develop, and strengthen solutions 
for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin 
due to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of 
climate change, and environmental degradation, such as 
desertification, land degradation, drought, and sea level 
rise, including by devising planned relocation and visa 
options, in cases where adaptation in or return to their 
country of origin is not possible
(7) International policy development Develop coherent approaches to address the challenges 
of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset 
and slow-onset natural disasters, including by taking into 
consideration relevant recommendations from State-led 
consultative processes, such as the Agenda for the Protec-
tion of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context 
of Disasters and Climate Change, and the Platform on 
Disaster Displacement
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and Members of Their Families (1990), the Protocols on Smuggling of Migrants 
and Trafficking in Persons (2000), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(WTO, 1995, Mode 4 on the movement of natural persons). Whole-of-government 
and multi-sector approaches will be needed to address the complexity of the climate-
mobility nexus and avoid goal conflicts.
The role of development cooperation in addressing climate mobility
The field of development cooperation has undergone an important transformation 
in recent years. The notion of development has evolved, from a narrow focus on 
economic growth and poverty reduction to a more multifaceted pursuit and assess-
ment of societal progress, reflected in the SDG combination of social, economic, 
environmental, and good governance objectives. At the same time, new actors and 
instruments of cooperation have emerged (Klingebiel,  2014). Development coop-
eration is increasingly understood to be more than aid, or the transfer of financial 
resources from rich to poor countries. While financing continues to be an important 
part of development cooperation, other measures, such as capacity development and 
policy change, have emerged as important levers (Alsonso & Glennie, 2015). This is 
especially true in the areas of climate change and migration, where what developed 
countries do at home—in terms of carbon emission reductions and visa and integra-
tion policies—may have greater effects on developing countries than any aid they 
give.
Alonso and Glennie (2015:5) define development cooperation as “Activity that 
aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities, is not 
driven by profit, discriminates in favor of developing countries, and is based on 
cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership.” 
There can be tension between principles for good development cooperation, such 
as the commitment to country ownership enshrined in the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (2011), and the use of development assis-
tance to address climate and migration policy goals. Aid may be targeted away 
from the poorest countries and people and subject to political pressures, e.g., 
to deter migrants from coming to rich countries and induce people to remain in 
their regions of origin (Hooper & Newland, 2018). Despite pledges for parity in 
spending on climate mitigation and adaptation, and an overall increase in climate 
finance between 2013 and 2017, only about 20% of bilateral and 27% of multilat-
eral climate finance went to adaptation programmes (OECD, 2018). Public fund-
ing for adaptation totaled $22 billion in 2016, a fraction of the $140–300 billion 
per year that UNEP estimates will be needed by 2030 (Chan & Amerasinghe, 
2018).
Our discussion of the role of development cooperation actors is based on prac-
tices of traditional donors channeled through bilateral or multilateral development 
agencies. A search on “climate AND migration” of the AidData database, which 
draws on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
records, yields a total of 222 projects (out of a total of almost 1.7 million entries) 
by 19 donor agencies between 2000 and 2014, ranging in investment from $263.5 
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million by the World Bank, $17 m by the USAID, $12 m by the former Canadian 
International Development Agency, $5  m by the Global Environmental Facil-
ity, and $2.6  m by German Development Cooperation (GIZ). The top program 
countries by funding volume are India, followed by China, Afghanistan, Senegal, 
Thailand, Zimbabwe, Haiti, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Over two-
thirds of the recorded interventions are coded as multi-sector, followed by those 
categorized as disaster prevention and preparedness, environmental protection, 
basic health, and conflict prevention and resolution. The majority of the projects 
are research related, designed to generate knowledge on the links between climate 
and migration in regions thought to be particularly susceptible to climate change 
impacts. Another focus area is support for livelihoods in climate-impacted areas 
and for the participation of affected populations in policy development.
Development interventions tend to be place-based rather than focused on 
a particular group of movers. As such, they cut across the whole spectrum of 
types of movements, including internally displaced persons and refugees, return 
migrants, pastoralists or transhumance, seasonal and labor migration, and rural to 
urban migration. The bulk of interventions is concerned with internal, rather than 
international movements related to climate impacts (Rigaud et  al., 2018; World 
Bank, 2019; Yonetani, 2018).
Development cooperation actors’ approach to climate mobility can be grouped 
into four categories:
(1) Adaptation and resilience-building in place
A first entry point for development cooperation actors is to use a displacement 
prevention lens on their adaptation and resilience-building programs. As the World 
Bank observes: “Even with expected out-migration, many climate-vulnerable areas 
will still need to support significant numbers of people. This increases the need for 
development strategies to support people to adapt locally or ‘stay in place’ in areas 
where it makes sense to do so” (World Bank, 2019: 29). A recent USAID report 
on climate mobility similarly focuses on the need to invest in disaster risk reduc-
tion and improved agricultural methods, though many of its recommendations 
(“improve livestock management,” “reduce deforestation,” and “improve housing 
construction”) remain at a high level (USAID, 2021).
Poverty reduction and social protection programs targeted at rural areas can 
help to increase adaptive capacity to climate change (Johnson et al., 2013). While 
countries may pursue different pathways to adaptation (Chapman et al., 2016), fre-
quent components of successful local adaptation strategies include investing in cli-
mate-smart infrastructure, diversifying income generating activities, building more 
responsive financial protection systems for vulnerable groups, and educating and 
empowering women. Likewise programs dedicated to disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
may enhance local resilience and reduce the need to migrate (UNDRR, 2019). 
Indeed, there is often a significant overlap between climate adaptation and DRR 
approaches, both of which aim for vulnerability reduction (Cardona et  al., 2012). 
In practice, this often translates into a focus on issues such as natural resource 
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management, land use planning, and the rollout of risk assessments and early warn-
ing systems. Yet, the time horizon for DRR interventions is usually more short term 
(focused on immediate risks) and, institutionally, DRR is typically the domain of 
civil defense or emergency response agencies, while climate change falls under the 
purview of ministries of the environment and adaptation falls under multiple line 
ministries (depending on the sector). Among the projects captured in the AidData 
dashboard, the USA features prominently as a donor with a multi-country invest-
ment in supporting capacity building for disaster preparedness in cooperation with 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
While much adaptation programming is focused on livelihoods, that alone 
seems insufficient when considering probable causes affecting people’s decisions 
to migrate: Gamso and Yuldashev (2017) find that government inefficiency, unac-
countability, and irresponsibility are important factors in encouraging outward 
migration, particularly among the poor. Governance aid, geared to strengthen politi-
cal institutions, is accompanied by reductions in the emigration rates of developing 
countries, whereas social and economic aid has no discernible relationship to emi-
gration. These findings are confirmed by UNDP’s Scaling Fences report (UNDP, 
2019), which observes that migration from Africa is driven by a sense of hopeless-
ness rather than poverty or unemployment. Where people lack a say in how to adapt 
to climate variability and changes in the environment, there is a risk that planning 
and development choices will exacerbate their vulnerability (De Haas, 2020), for 
instance when tree planting for carbon removal undermines other forms of land use 
that support people’s food security (Lee, 2019).
Going forward, ensuring financing for adaptation will be a critical consideration. 
Supporting partner countries to ensure that development strategies and proposals 
systematically include a climate risk lens could help stretch scarce adaptation funds 
(Chan & Amerasinghe, 2018). Innovative financing mechanisms such as debt swaps 
could provide disaster-prone countries that are highly indebted with the financial 
liquidity to invest in resilience and climate adaptation (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2015; Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2018). Remittances can play a key role in household 
and macro-level resilience. Creating financial products such as micro-credit, live-
stock insurance, and diaspora bonds could support countries in managing the high 
costs associated with disaster shocks, strengthen preparedness, and facilitate timely 
action (Plaza, 2019). Finally, climate index insurance is being tested in many regions 
to help poor farmers weather climate shocks (Hellmuth et al., 2009).
(2) Facilitating mobility as an integral part of climate adaptation
Just as it is important to reduce the need for people to move under distress, some 
development interventions recognize the risk of trapped populations who lack the 
financial and social capital to move out of harm’s way (Foresight, 2011). The United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (former DFID—now UK 
AID), for instance, explored how the use of cash transfers could enable households 
and communities to choose migration as an adaptation strategy (see AidData data-
base entry ID#: 906,000,415,839). An internal World Bank review suggests that 
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where there is no credible long-term pathway to viable livelihoods, well-planned 
migration to more conducive areas can be a successful strategy, including by provid-
ing people with the resources they may need to be able to move when “adaptation in 
place” has reached its limits (World Bank, 2019).
There seem to be few projects proactively supporting people’s use of migration 
as a means of adapting to climate change impacts. This may be due to a sedentary 
bias in national development and adaptation plans, where rural–urban migration is 
often conceived as putting unsustainable pressure on urban infrastructure and ser-
vices (Black & Sward, 2009; IOM, 2018a; Sward & Codjoe, 2012). Reviewing 82 
national and regional Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies, Yonetani (2018: 12) finds 
that “voluntary migration’s potentially positive contribution to resilience is seldom 
recognized. Few provisions were found to support (labor) migration as a form of 
adaptation or a coping strategy to avoid disaster.” However, IOM also observes that 
national strategies such as National Adaptation Plans, Intended Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions, Nationally Determined Contributions, and National Commu-
nications exhibit an increasing policy awareness of human mobility being driven by, 
and an adaptive response to, the adverse impacts of climate change (IOM, 2018a).
One example of a regional approach to climate-related mobility is the World 
Bank’s Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project for the countries of Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal (World Bank, 2019). The pro-
ject supports trans-boundary migration as an adaptation strategy for pastoralists 
threatened by climate change-induced droughts and conflict by improving the sub-
regional infrastructure (e.g., migration corridors, markets for regional trade in live-
stock products, and shared water points) for migrating pastoralists. This included 
the building of migration corridors, support for regional trade in livestock prod-
ucts, and the establishment of shared water points. Moreover, the project fostered 
regional collaboration and coordination to better manage shocks affecting livestock, 
such as drought and disease. There is growing interest in the potential of regional 
solutions and regional free movement frameworks (such as those enshrined under 
protocols of the Economic Community of West African States and the East African 
Community, for instance). The United Nations Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 
which supports the implementation of the GCM (MPTF, 2021), supports programs 
in the Pacific Islands and East Africa that seek to facilitate labor mobility and regu-
lar migration in the contexts of disasters and climate change. The European Union-
supported Pacific Climate Change and Migration project sought to increase the 
protection of individuals and communities vulnerable to climate change displace-
ment and migration through targeted national and regional policies. It also pursued 
increased labor mobility opportunities for Pacific Islanders, through well-managed 
labor migration schemes (see Oakes et al., 2016). The New Zealand Government has 
been deliberating options for managing climate related mobility in the face of rising 
sea levels across the Pacific Islands region (New Zealand MFAT, 2018).
(3)Moving people out of harm’s way: planned relocation or resettlement
There is clear recognition that moving people away from harm is an essential part 
of saving lives in an emergency. The most common reference to human mobility 
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in DRR strategies is in the context of planned relocation preparedness (Yonetani, 
2018). Country strategies such as National Adaptation Programmes of Action and 
national DRR strategies also recognize the need to relocate or resettle populations 
where their lives and livelihoods are threatened due to sea-level rise, flooding and 
landslides (Sward & Codjoe, 2012). International Organization for Migration’s map-
ping of National Adaptation Plans, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, 
Nationally Determined Contributions, and National Communications find references 
to relocation for instance in country submissions by Uruguay, Canada, Cuba, Fiji, 
Malta, Rwanda, and Samoa (IOM, 2018a). Relocation and resettlement are consid-
ered both a preventative measure for people living in situations of increasing disaster 
and displacement risk, as well as a post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery measure 
for displaced people unable to return home (de Sherbinin et al., 2011; Ferris, 2014; 
Yonetani, 2018).
Development cooperation actors’ involvement in planned relocation processes is 
trailed by a rather “dark history” of development-related relocations, including large 
numbers of people affected, lasting negative effects such as impoverishment for the 
displaced, and a disproportionate impact on indigenous and minority communities 
(Robinson, 2003). Oliver-Smith and de Sherbinin (2014) observe that disaster-related 
resettlement interventions have had a more successful track-record than development-
related resettlements, such as those associated with large dams. However, they caution 
that resettlement should always be an option of last resort. Indeed, much of the litera-
ture on relocations insists on the need for clear legal and policy frameworks, such as 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, to guide such efforts (e.g., UNHCR/
Brookings-LSE/IMI 2015; Ferris, 2014; de Sherbinin et al., 2011). Robinson (2003) 
stresses the importance of incorporating both an “assessment of risks” and a “recogni-
tion of rights” to avoid poor outcomes.
Connell and Coelho (2018) observe that as more countries are developing policies 
to address climate related relocation challenges, the involvement of multiple minis-
tries and levels of government is critical. Indeed, important elements to consider in 
the process of relocation, such as access to land, livelihoods, and services in relo-
cation areas and questions of financing and compensation (Chun, 2015; Koskinen-
Lewis et al., 2016) call for the involvement of planning and development authorities. 
The World Bank has begun implementing planned relocation projects under its West 
Africa Coastal Adaptation project in Sao Tome and Principe and Saint-Louis, Sen-
egal (World Bank, 2019). The Government of Fiji developed its National Relocation 
Guidelines to assist communities affected by sudden and slow-onset processes, with 
support from German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ, 2017).
(4) Managing displacement impacts
As noted above, development cooperation actors have gained an increasing role 
in responding to large-scale displacement situations in recent years. Recent bilat-
eral compacts between the European Union and Jordan (Grawert, 2019) and sev-
eral international partners and Ethiopia (Fanuel, 2017) have sought to entice host 
governments to grant refugees from neighboring countries rights, such as access 
to the labor market, in exchange for development financing and trade concessions. 
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The World Bank created its Global Concessional Financing Facility3 and the refu-
gee window under The International Development Association (IDA) 18 to provide 
concessional financing to low- and middle-income countries that host large numbers 
of refugees. Country programs that are specifically targeting refugee receiving areas 
combine place-based interventions that benefit the entire local population (e.g., 
infrastructure development, improvements in public services) with interventions that 
focus on the short-term needs of the displaced (e.g., specialized education, psycho-
social support, vocational training) (World Bank, 2019).
Where displaced populations settle in hazard-prone areas, they may be vulnerable 
to climate and disaster impacts, including the risk of consecutive displacement. For 
instance, rapidly growing megacities in river deltas such as Dhaka and Lagos are 
preferred migration destinations largely due to promising labor opportunities (Black 
et al., 2011), even though migrants in crowded urban environments often report a 
decline in wellbeing (Ayeb-Karlsson, 2020). Leveraging existing social (community, 
migration, etc.) networks could be an important mechanism in this context, since the 
existence of social institutions (churches, mosques, savings associations, and mutual 
aid) has been found to increase resilience (Adger et al., 2011; Trzaska et al., 2017).
The International Organization for Migration is working to ensure that migrants 
and internally displaced persons are part of DRR planning and responses. The 
Migrants in Countries in Crisis initiative, hosted by IOM, offers guidelines and a 
repository of good practices for the inclusion of migrants in disaster and emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery. IOM also offers countries support for tracking 
displacement to inform their disaster response (IOM, 2017).
Other interventions seek to address the environmental impacts of displaced popu-
lations in host communities and to make the response to displacement more sustain-
able, for instance, through infrastructure updates, improved waste management in 
cities (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Amman), or the use 
of renewable energy solutions in refugee camps (e.g., World Bank, 2019).
We have reviewed development cooperation actors’ engagement on climate 
mobility and found four categories of interventions: enabling people to stay through 
in situ adaptation measures, facilitating migration to support adaptation, facilitating 
planned relocations and resettlement to protect people from harm, and supporting 
destination areas in the reception of migrants.
Going forward we see a need for development cooperation actors to engage 
directly with affected communities and levels of government to co-design interven-
tions that respond to their needs and priorities and assess what works.
Future prospects and policy implications
The Covid-19 pandemic has been a large negative shock for development, throwing 
millions of people into poverty and leaving developing country governments with 
limited resources to support the poor and stimulate their economies without risking 
3 It provides development support on concessional terms to middle-income countries impacted by refu-
gee crises across the world.
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debt crises (UN/DESA,  2020). It has also resulted in widespread unemployment 
(and even “internal deportation” in India) of urban migrant laborers (Khanna, 2020), 
and a hardening of borders and more restrictive travel policies that have hindered 
international movements (O’Brien & Eger, 2020). As such, the Covid-19 pandemic 
could further deepen inequalities within and across countries and undermine the 
resilience of vulnerable people and nations to cope with the larger climate crisis.
The SDGs recognize that safe and orderly migration can minimize inequalities 
within and across countries. The question is how migration can happen in a safe and 
orderly manner under conditions of increasingly severe climate hazards. Governments 
at various levels, development agencies, and international and non-governmental 
organizations are already struggling to manage migration and displacement in a man-
ner that protects rights, reduces vulnerability and creates development opportunities. 
Prospects for scaling the ability to manage movements in line with need—whether 
for facilitated mobility or decent reception and long-term inclusion of the displaced—
seem severely constrained by a lack of proactive adaptation and urban planning in the 
case of internal movements, and the political realities of rising nationalism and xeno-
phobia for international migration. In a world shaped by the pandemic, the possible 
introduction of new travel requirements such as vaccine certificates will likely make 
international movements even more selective, while fuelling the underground business 
of smugglers.
In contrast to the Covid-19 pandemic, no vaccine for climate change is envi-
sioned that would reverse global warming and its negative impacts on social, eco-
nomic, and ecological systems. Ahead of COP-26 in Glasgow and with the arrival of 
the new United States (US) administration, there is however some hope for renewed 
political momentum around the need for ambitious climate action. Indeed, the US 
administration is showing an appetite for leadership not just on climate change, but 
also on migration. In a recent Executive Order on refugee resettlement and plan-
ning for the impacts of climate change on migration, President of the USA, Joseph 
R. Biden requested his administration to produce a report on “climate change and 
its impact on migration, including forced migration, internal displacement, and 
planned relocation” within 180 days (White House, 2021, Sec.6). Besides consid-
eration of the international security implications, the report is to include “options 
for protection and resettlement of individuals displaced directly or indirectly from 
climate change” and “proposals for how these findings should affect use of United 
States foreign assistance to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change” (White 
House, 2021, Sec.6).
Arguably, the report (White House, 2021) presents a number of important open-
ings to (a) mobilize whole-of-government and whole-of-society engagement in the 
report drafting process, reflective of the many sectors and actors that can contribute 
to building out the climate mobility “toolbox”; (b) adopt a deliberate, developmental 
approach to climate mobility that counterbalances security narratives by recognizing 
the positive contributions of migrants and refugees to the societies they leave and 
join; and (c) articulate how US political leadership and the strategic use of its exter-
nal cooperation tools can be leveraged to support climate adaptation and resilience-
building in the most vulnerable countries, cities and communities; the development 
of cooperative arrangements for facilitated mobility; and the permanent resettlement 
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of displaced people in the US. In seizing this opportunity, the US can set an example 
for others and rally them. It can also assert its influence in multilateral development 
banks and agencies.
For those banks and agencies, continued investment in improving the evidence base 
for interventions, including through direct engagement with affected communities, will 
be critical. We conclude by outlining three areas for further exploration in this regard:
1. Dynamics in climate hotspots: Much research has focused on the most vulnerable 
areas, or “hot spots” of potential out-migration. This includes low-lying regions 
and islands with high population density and coastal agricultural areas (e.g., 
river deltas). However, beyond understanding exposure to the physical impacts 
of climatic changes, it will be increasingly important to understand feedback 
loops, i.e., secondary effects in economic and social systems, and how those 
are affecting people’s vulnerability and propensity to move. This also requires 
improved monitoring and evaluation of the impacts (and potentially unintended 
consequences) of development and adaptation policy and programs. It will also 
be critical to ensure that climate information is generated in consultation with, 
and available to, the communities that need it most to make informed decisions 
regarding adaptation choices.
2. Development in climate mobility destinations: Development cooperation needs 
to focus attention on the current and potential future destination areas of climate 
mobility, including the impact of mobility on the latter’s adaptation pathways. 
To support positive outcomes for sustainable development, it will be necessary 
to channel resources towards, and work directly with, local authorities and com-
munities to help them anticipate and respond to climate mobility pressures and 
opportunities. Poor and marginalized populations residing in slums or squatter 
settlements that are particularly prone to environmental hazards must be a key 
consideration (de Sherbinin et al., 2007; Gemenne et al., 2020). Groups like the 
Mayors Migration Council and the C40 Cities are working together to support 
cities in assessing and managing the interactions of climate change, migration 
and inclusion in their jurisdictions.
3. Leveraging transnational migrant ties for development: There is scope for fur-
ther exploring and developing programming around the role of translocal and 
transnational ties in building resilience (Greiner et al., 2015; Farbotko, 2020). 
This includes, but is not limited to, supporting the role of remittances in building 
household and macro-level resilience and developing financial products that could 
be used to enhance their impact (Plaza, 2019). 
Climate mobility, while raising legal and operational challenges, requires political 
solutions to be negotiated at various scales—be it cities coming together in regional 
coalitions to do joint adaptation planning (Shi, 2017), governments negotiating 
bilateral agreements to facilitate resettlement (Amakrane, 2021), or regional bodies 
incorporating climate mobility as part of regional free movement agreements (Wood, 
2019). Development cooperation actors can support such efforts and use their conven-
ing power to facilitate joint analysis, planning and implementation of strategies across 
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multiple levels of governance and sectors of policy making at national level, and to 
support knowledge-sharing and coalition-building among similarly affected countries 
and communities across borders. Their quest for eliminating extreme poverty, reduc-
ing inequalities and generating prosperity ultimately depends on it.
Acknowledgements This work is based on a report supported by the German Institute for Development 
Evaluation (DEval) as part of a larger evaluation of climate change adaptation measures. We are grateful 
to four anonymous reviewers and the editor in chief for insightful comments on earlier versions of this 
manuscript. Alex de Sherbinin acknowledges support from the Columbia Climate School and its Earth 
Institute for the Climate Mobility Network.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative 
Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this 
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permis-
sion directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ 
 licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Abel, G. J., Brottrager, M., Cuaresma, J. C., & Muttarak, R. (2019). Climate, conflict and forced migra-
tion. Global Environmental Change, 54, 239–249.
Adams, H., & Kay, S. (2019). Migration as a human affair: Integrating individual stress thresholds into 
quantitative models of climate migration. Environmental Science & Policy, 93, 129–138.
Adeola, R. (2020). Climate change, Internal Displacement and the Kampala Convention. Policy Briefing. 
South African Institute of International Affairs. Available at: https:// media. afric aport al. org/ docum ents/ 
Adeol a_-_ Final. pdf (Accessed on 29 Oct 2020)
Adger, W. N., Brown, K., Nelson, D. R., Berkes, F., Eakin, H., Folke, C., & Ruitenbeek, J. (2011). 
Resilience implications of policy responses to climate change. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change, 2(5), 757–766.012–0028.
Adger, W. N., Safra, R., de Campos, S., Codjoe, N. A., Siddiqui, T., Hazra, S., Das, S., Adams, H., 
Gavonel, M. F., Mortreux, C., & Abu, M. (2021). Perceived environmental risks and insecurity 
reduce future migration intentions in hazardous migration source areas. One Earth, 4(1), 146–157.
Agrawala, S., & Van Aalst, M. (2008). Adapting development cooperation to adapt to climate change. 
Climate Policy, 8(2), 183–193.
Aleinikoff, T. A., & Zamore, L. (2019). The arc of protection: Reforming the international refugee 
regime. Stanford University Press.
Alsonso, J.A. & Glennie, J. (2015). What is development cooperation? 2016 Development Cooperation 
Forum Policy Briefs, No. 1. https:// www. un. org/ en/ ecosoc/ newfu nct/ pdf15/ 2016_ dcf_ policy_ brief_ 
no.1. pdf
Amakrane, K. (2021). Sinking out of sight. The World Today. Chatham House. Accessed on 30 April 2021 at: 
https:// www. chath amhou se. org/ publi catio ns/ the- world- today/ 2021- 02/ human- trage dy- clima te- crisis
Auffhammer, M., & Vincent, J. R. (2012). Unobserved time effects confound the identification of cli-
mate change impacts: Table 1. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(30), 11973–
11974. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1073/ pnas. 12020 49109
Ayeb-Karlsson, S. (2020). ‘When we were children we had dreams, then we came to Dhaka to survive’: 
Urban stories connecting loss of wellbeing, displacement and (im)mobility. Climate and Develop-
ment. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 17565 529. 2020. 17770 78
Ayeb-Karlsson, S., Smith, C. D., & Kniveton, D. (2018). A discursive review of the textual use of 
‘trapped’ in environmental migration studies: The conceptual birth and troubled teenage years of 
trapped populations. Ambio, 47(5), 557–573.
Baldwin, A., Fröhlich, C., & Rothe, D. (2019). From climate migration to anthropocene mobilities: Shift-
ing the debate. Mobilities, 14(3), 289–297.
 Population and Environment
1 3
Berlemann, M., & Steinhardt, M. F. (2017). Climate change, natural disasters, and migration—A sur-
vey of the empirical evidence. CESifo Economic Studies, 63(4), 353–385.https:// doi. org/ 10. 
1093/ acprof: oso/ 97801 98795 681. 001. 0001
Bettini, G., & Gioli, G. (2016). Waltz with development: Insights on the developmentalization of cli-
mate-induced migration. Migration and Development, 5(2), 171–189.
Betts, A. (2010). Survival migration: A new protection framework. Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organizations, 16(3), 361–382.
Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J., Omata, N. (2016). Refugee economies—Forced displacement and 
develop.
Black, R. & Sward, J. (2009). Migration, poverty reduction strategies and human development, 
Human Development Research Paper 2009/38.
Black, R., Bennett, S. R., Thomas, S. M., & Beddington, J. R. (2011). Migration as adaptation. 
Nature, 478(7370), 447–449.
Boas, I., Farbotko, C., Adams, H., Sterly, H., Bush, S., van der Geest, K., & Blondin, S. (2019). Cli-
mate migration myths. Nature. Climate Change, 9(12), 901–903.
Bohra-Mishra P., Oppenheimer M., & Hsiang S. (2014). Nonlinear permanent migration response to cli-
matic variations but minimal response to disasters. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, 
111, 9780–9785.
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. (2011). Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November - 1 December 2011. ISSN: 27075583 
(online) https:// doi. org/ 10. 1787/ d571f 17c- en
Cardona, O.D., van Aalst, M. K., Birkmann, J., Fordham, M., McGregor, G., Perez, R., Pulwarty, 
R. S., Schipper, E. L. F., & Sinh,  B. T. (2012). Determinants of risk: exposure and vulnerability. In: 
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 
[Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. 
Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. A special report of 
Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, pp. 65–108.
Chan, C. & Amerasinghe, N. (2018). Deploying adaptation finance for maximum impact. Moving beyond 
the adaptation vs. development false dichotomy. World Resources Institute Commentary.
Chapman, A., Tompkins, E.L., Vincent, K., Day, S. (2016). A framework for the design and evalua-
tion of adaptation pathways in large river deltas. DECCMA Working Paper, Deltas, Vulnerabil-
ity and Climate Change: Migration and Adaptation, IDRC Project Number 107642. Available 
online at https:// www. deccma. com
Chun, J. (2015). Planned relocations in the Mekong Delta: A successful model for climate change 
adaptation, a cautionary tale, or both? Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, June.
Commonwealth Secretariat. (2015). Debt swaps for climate change adaptation and mitigation: A com-
monwealth proposal. Discussion Paper No. 19. March.
Connell, J. & Coelho, S. (2018). Planned relocation in Asia and the Pacific, in: Forced Migration Review 
59. Twenty Years of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
Dalby, S. (2018). Climate change and environmental conflicts (pp. 17–28). Routledge.
De Haas, H. (2020). Climate refugees. The fabrication of a migration threat. http:// heind ehaas. blogs pot. 
com/ 2020/ 01/ clima te- refug ees- fabri cation- of. html Cited 4 March 2020.
De Sherbinin, A. (2020): Impacts of climate change as drivers of migration. Migration Policy Insti-
tute. 23 October 2020. Available at https:// www. migra tionp olicy. org/ artic le/ impac ts- clima te- 
change- drive rs- migra tion
De Sherbinin, A., Schiller, A., & Pulsipher, A. (2007). The vulnerability of global cities to climate 
hazards. Environment & Urbanization, 19(1), 39–64.
De Sherbinin, A., Levy, M., Adamo, S., MacManus, K., Yetman, G., Mara, V., & Pistolesi, L. (2012). 
Migration and risk: net migration in marginal ecosystems and hazardous areas. Environmental 
Research Letters, 7(4), 045602.
De Sherbinin, A., M. Castro, F. Gemenne, M.M. Cernea, et  al. (2011). Preparing for resettlement 
associated with climate change. Science, 334, 456–457.
DFID (UK Department for International Development). (2009). Helpdesk research report: Climate 
change and migration. 4 September 2009.
Eriksen, S. E., & Næss, L. O. (2003). Pro-poor climate adaptation: Norwegian development cooperation and 
climate change adaptation-an assessment of issues, strategies and potential entry points. CICERO Report.
1 3
Population and Environment 
Fanuel, S. (2017). Ethiopia - Jobs Compact Project (English). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 
http:// docum ents. world bank. org/ curat ed/ en/ 58024 14998 55149 882/ Ethio pia- Jobs- Compa ct- Proje ct
Farbotko, C. (2020): New approaches to climate change and migration: Building the adaptive capacity of 
mobile populations. Migration Policy Institute. Available at https:// www. migra tionp olicy. org/ resea rch/ 
clima te- change- build ing- adapt ive- capac ity
Feng, S., Krueger, A. B., & Oppenheimer, M. (2010). Linkages among climate change, crop yields and 
Mexico–US cross-border migration. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(32), 
14257–14262.
Ferris, E. (2014). Planned relocations, disasters and climate change: Consolidating good practices and pre-
paring for the future. Background paper for the UNHCR-Brookings-Georgetown Sanremo Consultation.
Ferris, E. (2020). Research on climate change and migration where are we and where are we going? 
Migration Studies, 8(4), 612–625.
Foresight. (2011). Migration and global environmental change. UK Government Office for Science.
Gamso, J. & Yuldashev, F. (2017). Targeted foreign aid and international migration: Is development pro-
motion an effective immigration policy?, University of Pittsburgh AIDDATA Research Lab at Wil-
liam & Mary, Working paper 37.
GCIM. (2005). Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action. Report of the Global Com-
mission on International Migration.
GCM. (2018). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, UN doc A/RES/73/195 (19 
December 2018).
GCR. (2018). Global Compact on Refugees, UN doc A/73/12 (Part II) (2 August 2018).
Gemenne, F., Zickgraf, C., Depoux, A., Pettinotti, L., Cavicchioli, A., & Rosengaertner, S. (2020). Trans-
formative climate action in cities. Forced Migration Review 63. Cities and Towns.
GIZ. (2017). Human mobility in the context of climate change. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Bonn. Available at https:// www. giz. de/ en/ world wide/ 67177. html
Gonzalez, C. G. (2020). Climate change, race, and migration. Journal of Law and Political Economy, 1, 109–146.
Grawert, E. (2019). The EU–Jordan Compact: A model for burden-sharing in refugee crises? BICC Policy 
Brief 3. Available from : https:// www. bicc. de/ uploa ds/ tx_ bicct ools/ BICC_ Policy_ Brief_3_ 2019. pdf
Greiner, C., Peth, S. A., & Sakdapolrak, P. (2015): Deciphering migration in the age of climate change. 
Towards an understanding of translocal relations in social-ecological systems. TransRe Work-
ing Paper No. 2, Department of Geography, University of Bonn, Bonn. DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 
13140/2. 1. 4402. 9765
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. (1998). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
United Nations Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998, noted in Comm. Hum. Rts. res. 
1998/50.
Hellmuth, M. E., Osgood, D. E., Hess, U., Moorhead, A., & Bhojwani, H. (2009). Index insurance and 
climate risk: Prospects for development and disaster management. International Research Institute 
for Climate and Society (IRI).
Hooper, K., & Newland, K. (2018). Mind the Gap: Bringing Migration into Development Partnerships 
and Vice Versa. MPI Policy Brief no. 4. July.
Hugo, G. (1996). Environmental concerns and international migration. The International Migration 
Review, 30(1), 105–131.
Huq, S., & Reid, H. (2004). Mainstreaming adaptation in development. IDS Bulletin 35.3 Climate Change 
and Development.
ICPD. (1994): Programme of action of the international conference on population and development. A/
CONF.171/13.
IOM. (2017). Taking Sendai Forward. IOM strategic work plan on disaster risk reduction & resilience 
2017–2020. Geneva, International Organization for Migration.
IOM. (2018a). Mapping human mobility and climate change in relevant national policies and institutional frame-
works. Geneva, International Organization for Migration. Available from: www. envir onmen talmi grati on. 
iom. int/ iom- pdd- task- force- displ aceme nt- stake holder- meeti ng.
IOM (2018b). Mapping human mobility (migration, displacement and planned relocation) and climate 
change in international processes, policies and legal frameworks. Geneva, International Organi-
zation for Migration. Available from: www. envir onmen talmi grati on. iom. int/ iom- pdd- task- force- 
displ aceme nt- stake holder- meeti ng.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Fami-
lies (1990). UN Document A/RES/45/158; 30 ILM 1517. U.N. General Assembly Resolution. United 
Nations, New York.
 Population and Environment
1 3
IPCC. (2014). Summary for Policymakers. In: Field C, Barros V, Dokken D, et al. (eds) Climate change 
2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: Global and sectoral aspects. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, USA, pp 1–32.
IPCC. (2018). Global warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 
°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context 
of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and 
efforts to eradicate poverty.
Johnson, C., BanshaDulal, H., Prowse, M., Krishnamurthy, K., & Mitchell, T. (2013). Social protection and 
climate change: Emerging issues for research, policy and practice. Development Policy Review, 31, 
o2–o18.
Jubilee Debt Campaign. (2018). Don’t owe, shouldn’t pay. The impact of climate change on debt in 
vulnerable countries. Worcester, Jubilee Debt Campaign. Available at https:// jubil eedebt. org. uk/ 
report/ dont- owe- shoul dnt- pay- the- impact- of- clima te- change- on- debt- in- vulne rable- count ries
Kalin, W. (2010). Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement. In: McAdam, J. (ed.) Climate Change 
and Displacement. Hart Publishing, pp.81-103.
Khanna, A. (2020). Impact of migration of labour force due to global COVID-19 pandemic with refer-
ence to India. Journal of Health Management, 22(2), 181–191.
Katz, M. (2020). The world’s refugee system is broken, The Atlantic, 29 February 2020. https:// doi. org/ 10. 
1057/ 97811 37397 881_2
Kelley, C. P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M. A., Seager, R., & Kushnir, Y. (2015). Climate change in the Fertile Cres-
cent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
112(11), 3241–3246.
Klingebiel S. (2014). Development cooperation actors: The new variety of donors. In: Development 
cooperation: Challenges of the new aid architecture. Palgrave Pivot, London. https:// doi. org/ 10. 
1057/ 97811 37397 881_2
Koskinen-Lewis, P., A. de Carvalho, C. M. Dias, C. Fernandes, O. Diogo, L. Taulealo, F. Evalu & N. Simi, 
(2016 )“Managing population retreat from at-risk areas” SISRI Knowledge Note No. 3. Small Island 
States Resilience Initiative. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
(GFDRR). Washington DC.
Lee, H. (2019). Climate Action and Sustainable Development are inseparable. SDG Knowledge Hub. Avail-
able at https:// sdg. iisd. org/ comme ntary/ guest- artic les/ clima te- action- and- susta inable- devel opment- 
are- insep arable/ Cited 4 March 2020.
Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G. et  al. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and 
appraisal. Population and Development Review, 19, 431. https:// doi. org/ 10. 2307/ 29384 62
McLeman, R., & Smit, B. (2006). Migration as an adaptation to climate change. Climatic Change, 76(1–
2), 31–53.
McMichael, C., Farbotko, C., Piggott-McKellar, A., Powell, T., & Kitara, M. (2021). Rising seas, immo-
bilities, and translocality in small island states: Case studies from Fiji and Tuvalu. Population and 
Environment. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s11111- 021- 00378-6
Missirian, A., & Schlenker, W. (2017). Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations. Science, 
358(6370), 1610–1614.
MPTF. (2021). Pipeline of joint programmes. Migration MPTF Fund Management Unit, UN Network on 
Migration Secretariat.
Nawrotzki, R. J., Hunter, L. M., Runfola, D. M., Riosmena, F. (2015a) Climate change as a migration 
driver from rural and urban Mexico. Environmental Research Letters 10:114023.
Nawrotzki, R. J., & Bakhtsiyarava, M. (2017). International climate migration: Evidence for the climate 
inhibitor mechanism and the agricultural pathway. Population, Space and Place, 23(4), e2033.
Nawrotzki, R. J., Riosmena, F., Hunter, L. M., & Runfola, D. M. (2015b). Amplification or suppression: 
Social networks and the climate change–migration association in rural Mexico. Global Environmental 
Change, 35, 463–474. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1016/j. gloen vcha. 2015. 09. 002
Nawrotzki, R. J., Runfola, D. M., Hunter, L. M., & Riosmena, F. (2016). Domestic and international climate 
migration from Rural Mexico. Human Ecology, 44(6), 687–699.
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2018). Pacific Climate change-related displacement 
and migration: a New Zealand action plan. Cabinet paper. Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
May.
1 3
Population and Environment 
Oakes, R., Milan, A., & Campbell J. (2016). Kiribati: Climate change and migration—Relationships between 
household vulnerability, human mobility and climate change. Report No. 20. Bonn: United Nations 
University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS).
O’Brien, M. L., & Eger, M. A. (2020). Suppression, spikes, and stigma: How COVID-19 will shape inter-
national migration and hostilities toward it. International Migration Review. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 
01979 18320 968754
OECD. (2018). Climate finance from developed to developing countries: 2013–17 public flows. OECD 
Publishing.
Oliver-Smith, A., & de Sherbinin, A. (2014). Something old and something new: Resettlement in the twenty 
first century. In: S. Martin et al. (eds). Migration and Humanitarian Crises. Oxon, UK: Routledge.
Özden Ç, & Schiff, M. W. (2006) International migration, remittances, and the brain drain. Palgrave Macmil-
lan, Washington, DC; Basingstoke.
PDD. (2021). Platform on Disaster Displacement. The Context. Geneva, Platform on Disaster Displacment. 
Available at https:// disas terdi splac ement. org/ the- platf orm/ the- conte xt
Plaza, S. (2019). Migration, remittances and diaspora resources in crisis and disaster risk finance. World Bank 
Blogs. Washington DC, World Bank Group. Available at https:// blogs. world bank. org/ peopl emove/ 
migra tion- remit tances- and- diasp ora- resou rces- crisis- and- disas ter- risk- finan ce
Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons. (2000). Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 
(2001). U.N. General Assembly Resolution. United Nations, New York.
Rain, D. (2018). Eaters of the dry season: Circular labor migration in the West African Sahel. Routledge.
Ratha, D. (2013). The impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty reduction. MPI Policy Brief 
no. 8. September.
Ratha, D., & Xu, Z. (2008). Migration and Remittances Factbook. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1596/ 978-0- 8213- 7413-9
Ribot, J.C., P. Faye & M.D. Turner. (2020). Climate of anxiety in the sahel: Emigration in xenophobic times. 
Public Culture Vol. 32, No. 1.
Rigaud, K. K., de Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Bergmann, J., Clement, V., Ober, K., Schewe, J., Adamo, S., 
McCusker, B., Heuser, S., & Midgley, A. (2018). Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate migra-
tion. World Bank.
Robinson, C. (2003). Risks and rights: The causes, consequences, and challenges of development-induced 
displacement, Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution - SAIS Project on Internal Displacement.
Romankiewicz, C., & Doevenspeck, M. (2015). Climate and mobility in the West African Sahel: Concep-
tualising the local dimensions of the environment and migration nexus. In Grounding global climate 
change (pp. 79–100). Springer, Dordrecht.
Shi, L. (2017). A new climate for regionalism: metropolitan experiments in climate change adaptation. The-
sis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, http:// 
hdl. handle. net/ 1721.1/ 111370
Sward, J., Codjoe, S. (2012). Human mobility and climate change adaptation policy: A review of migra-
tion in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). Migrating out of Poverty RPC Working 
Paper 6. Migrating out of Poverty Consortium, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (2012) 44 pp.
The Cancun Adaptation Framework. (2010). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Climate Negotiations in Cancun (COP16), Climate Change. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, 
held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. (2015). Document adopted at the Third 
UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015. The United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva.
Trzaska, S., de Sherbinin, A., Kim-Blanco, P., Mara, V., Schnarr, E., Jaiteh, M., Mondal, P.  (2017). Climate 
change vulnerability assessment in mangrove regions of Sierra Leone: Long version. Report published 
under the USAID West Africa Biodiversity and Climate Change (WA BiCC) project. Palisades, NY: 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University.
UN/DESA. (2020). The long-term impact of COVID-19 on poverty. Policy Brief #86. Available at: https:// 
www. un. org/ devel opment/ desa/ dpad/ publi cation/ un- desa- policy- brief- 86- the- long- term- impact- of- 
covid- 19- on- pover ty/
UNCTAD. (2018). Migration for structural transformation. Economic Development in Africa Report.
UNDP. (2009). 2009 Human development report—Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. 
United Nations Development Program.
 Population and Environment
1 3
UNDP. (2019). Scaling fences: Voices of irregular African migrants to Europe. United Nations Development 
Program.
UNDRR. (2019). Words into Action guidelines—Disaster displacement: How to reduce risk, address impacts 
and strengthen resilience. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
UNFCCC. (2015). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 
November to 13 December 2015, UN FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, Available from: https:// unfccc. int/ resou rce/ docs/ 2015/ cop21/ eng/ 10a01. pdf
UNHCR. (2019). Climate change and disaster displacement in the Global Compact on Refugees. United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva. Available at https:// www. unhcr. org/ 5c9e1 3297. pdf
UNHCR. (2020). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2019. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees.
UNHCR, Brookings-LSE, ISIM. (2015). Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environmental 
change through planned relocation. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
United Nations General Assembly. (2006). Summary of the high-level dialogue on international migration 
and development, A/61/515.
United Nations General Assembly. (2013). Declaration of the high-level dialogue on international migration 
and development, A/68/L.5.
United Nations General Assembly. (2016a). One humanity: shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-
General for the World Humanitarian Summit. A/70/709.
United Nations General Assembly. (2016b). New York declaration for refugees and migrants. Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016. A/Res/71/1.
United Nations General Assembly. (2018a). Global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration. Resolu-
tion adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2018, A/RES/73/195.
United Nations General Assembly. (2018b). Global compact on refugees. Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 17 December 2018. A/RES/73/151.
UNPD. (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division. United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019
USAID (US Agency for International Development). (2021). People on the move: Strengthening adaptation 
responses to support human movement in a changing climate. USAID.
Vinke, K., Bergmann, J., Blocher, J., Upadhyay, H., & Hoffmann, R. (2020). Migration as adaptation? Migra-
tion Studies, 8(4), 626–634.
Weerasinghe, S. (2018). In Harm’s Way: International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between 
conflict or violence and disaster or climate change, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research 
Series, Division of International Protection, PPLA/2018/05 December.
White House. (2021). Executive order on rebuilding and enhancing programs to resettle refugees and plan-
ning for the impact of climate change on migration. Office of the White House, Washington, D.C., 
Available at: https:// www. white house. gov/ briefi ng- room/ presi denti al- actio ns/ 2021/ 02/ 04/ execu tive- 
order- on- rebui lding- and- enhan cing- progr ams- to- reset tle- refug ees- and- plann ing- for- the- impact- of- 
clima te- change- on- migra tion/
Wood, T. (2019). The role of free movement of persons agreements in addressing disaster displacement. A 
study of Africa. Platform for Disaster Displacement.
World Bank. (2019). Operational experiences & lessons learned at the climate-migration nexus—A world 
bank portfolio review (discussion draft).
WTO. (1995). General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). World Trade Organization, Geneva. 
Available at https:// www. wto. org/ engli sh/ docs_e/ legal_e/ 26- gats_ 01_e. htm
Yonetani, M. (2018). Mapping the baseline—To what extent are displacement and other forms of human 
mobility integrated in national and regional disaster risk reduction strategies? Platform for Disas-
ter Displacement (PDD).
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps 
and institutional affiliations.
1 3
Population and Environment 
Authors and Affiliations
Robert Stojanov1  · Sarah Rosengaertner2 · Alex de Sherbinin3  · 
Raphael Nawrotzki4 
 Sarah Rosengaertner 
 roses480@newschool.edu
 Alex de Sherbinin 
 adesherbinin@ciesin.columbia.edu
 Raphael Nawrotzki 
 r.nawrotzki@gmail.com
1 Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno, Zemedelska 1, 613 00 Brno, 
Czech Republic
2 The New School, Zolberg Institute On Migration and Mobility, NY, USA
3 Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), The Earth Institute, 
Columbia University, NY, USA
4 German Institute for Development Evaluation (Deval), Bonn, Germany
